trade (Ando 2006) , it remains unclear whether multinational companies follow rather countryspecific determinants after lifting trade barriers, or does international fragmentation stem from industry specifics.
There were only few papers on intra-industry trade relations of the former socialist countries from the country-specifics perspective, most of them since the year 2000 (Gabrisch and Segnana 2002, and Gaetano and Galego 2007 for European transition countries, or Zhang et al. 2005 for China). While Fidrmuc et al. (1999) examined the relationship between intra-industry trade and trade liberalisation for this region, the following research focused on two sets of variables, which are of specific interest for the current study. The first set of variables includes relative factor endowment and/or differences in technology. Factor endowment and/or technology differences between the EU and CEECs became visible after the opening of the economy and the imposing of free trade agreements in bilateral trade. Different from most other researches we try to clearly distinguish between cost and quality determinants. The second one captures differences in income distribution. The paper does not treat income distribution as a time-invariant variable.
Rather, it is the change of differences between countries that is considered, not least, since CEECs experienced major changes in their income distribution towards more inequality (and back) during their transition from socialist to market economies.
The remainder of this study includes four sections: Section 1 discusses the position of technology and capital/labour ratios, and income distribution in the theory of intra-industry trade and open questions in theoretical and of empirical research. Section 2 presents the empirical approach including equations to be tested, variables and data. Section 3 reports the findings, and section 4 provides conclusions and some policy-oriented hypotheses for further research.
COST A D TECH OLOGY ADVA TAGES, A D I COME DISTRIBUTIO I THE THEORY A D EMPIRICISM OF I TRA-I DUSTRY TRADE
Income distribution within each country and differences in technology do not matter in firstgeneration models of intra-industry trade (see above all Helpman 1987, and Hummels' and Levinsohn's empirical 1995 study). The intra-industry shares of bilateral trade increase with rising similarity of countries by size, and declines with rising differences in capital/labour ratios.
The latter explains the inter-industry trade component in total trade. The models assume that 4 households in two countries consume all varieties of differentiated goods of the same quality. In empirical research, GDP differences represent the similarity by size, which stands for similar consumer tastes and serves as an argument for horizontal trade patterns. The GDP per capita (or worker) stands for different capital/labour ratios. A capital abundant country is thought to pay higher wages than a labour abundant country. While empirical estimations confirmed the positive impact of size similarity on intra-industry trade share, Hummels and Levinsohn (1995) revealed a negative sign of the relative GDP per capita in pooled OLS estimations as predicted. However, when panel estimations with fixed effects were used in order to 'clear' the error term from truly idiosyncratic errors, the sign turned positive. The authors explained this change with country-pair specific effects like distance and land to labour ratios, which are beyond the theory of intraindustry trade. Durkin and Krygier (2000) challenged this conclusion, pointing at the possibility that intra-industry trade is not overwhelmingly horizontal but vertical, and thus the GDP per capita variable can obtain a positive sign in a specific theory of vertical intra-industry trade. This specific theory also has close relations to an increasing number of studies that revealed the important role that quality plays as a determinant of the global patterns of bilateral trade (Schott 2004; Hallak 2005) .
In contrast to first-generation models, vertical intra-industry trade models necessarily assume that each household consumes only one variety of goods, which is differentiated according to quality. Therefore, income distribution within a country matters with respect to the combination of varieties consumed by that nation. With rising differences in income distribution, the models predict the vertical intra-industry share to rise. Empirical research seems to have confirmed this relationship. 2 However, two problems appear with these studies: (i) Inequality in income distribution is treated as a time-invariant country-pair specific effect in most research (Durkin -Krygier 2000; Martin-Montaner -Orts Ríos 2002 (missing from the referenesxxx), Zhang et al. 2005 ). The argument is that income distribution tends to remain stable over time. In a larger time horizon, this treatment is not plausible at least for European transition countries where inequality increased quickly in the first stage of their transition (Milanovic 1998; AghionCommander 1999 Existing empirical research focuses on the structures of the production side, since the household side is not sufficient to explain, which of the varieties is produced in each of the trading countries. Borrowing from the traditional trade theory, vertical intra-industry trade models split into neo-Heckscher-Ohlin (neo-OH) and neo-Ricardian approaches. In empirical neo-HO models, the GDP per capita stands for capital/labour ratio but, in contrast to the firstgeneration theory, a positive correlation to intra-industry trade is predicted. However, when total trade includes vertical intra-industry trade and inter-industry trade, factor proportions cannot explain both. Falvey -Kierzkowski (1987) A plausibility problem with the neo-HO approach is that the relative price of each variety of differentiated goods is driven by relative costs. Hence, quality differences reflect cost differences, an assumption which hardly seems to have 'the right feel' (Krugman 1986, p. 37) .
Simply put, if one wants to have both vertical intra-industry trade and factor endowment, one might be forced to make appropriate but implausible assumptions. The neo-Ricardian model of vertical intra-industry trade, which Flam -Helpman (1987) developed, might be a good candidate to solve this problem. With one factor input (labour) only, differences in technology explain one country's advantage in producing a higher quality of differentiated goods. With monopolistic competition, quality differences are reflected in price and wage differences. In this model, there is no room for factor endowment differences. An improvement in technology in the home country improves the advantage to this country in producing a high quality variety and raises the price of 6 that variety as well as the wage rate in producing it. A change in the relative price of differentiated goods sets incentives for the reallocation of production: more labour will be used for the high-quality variety in the home country and for the low-quality variety in the foreign country. The appealing feature of this model is that it explains a product-quality cycle in which the less developed country begins to produce varieties that were produced in the advanced country, after the latter has started to produce new varieties at a higher quality level. RELTECH measures for differences in the endowment with technology. RELINDIS stands for differences in income distribution. The MIN and MAX variables represent size differences in terms of total GDP, and they stand for the similarity of consumer tastes and the power of HIIT.
MINSIZE j (MAXSIZE) selects the lower (larger) GDP from a pair of countries. DISTANCE is a representative for transaction costs of trade, which increases with a larger geographical distance.
It brings the model closer to gravity models of trade. All pooled specifications include a liberalisation dummy, which captures the membership of a member in the EU customs union (CUDUM). 6 If a CEE country is a member of the union, the dummy receives the value 1 (which applies to eight of the ten countries for 2004, Bulgaria and Romania excepted). In all other cases, the dummy receives the value 0.
A first problem is that the REL-variables are endogenously determined by VIIT. If endogeneity is present, then OLS estimates will be biased and inconsistent. To test this hypothesis, we need to find a set of instrumental variables that are correlated with the suspect REL-variable but not with the error term of the VIIT equation. However, the cost of using TSLS is a scaling down in the number of observations. A second problem might be multicollinearity between REL-variables. We are concerned that the applied range of technologies is correlated with the GDP per capita, and regressions might result in unreliable coefficient estimates.
Therefore, we prefer to run regressions, which include only one of both variables.
Pooled regressions produce a common constant for all country-pairs. At first glance, this seems to be the appropriate specification, since bilateral trade agreements between the EU and CEECs are identical, for trade policy is a matter for the EU authorities and not of single member countries. However, one cannot exclude that apart from general trade rules of the EU, bilateral trade relations are ruled by other specifics, including non-economic ones. For example, border trade regimes (Germany-Poland, Austria-Hungary, Italy-Slovenia) might exert a certain impact on bilateral trade compared to other country pairs (France-Poland, Belgium-Slovenia). Further, different regimes of factor movement (capital, labour) might affect bilateral trade. And in pooled regressions, the error term might include time-invariant effects beyond the distance variable such as cultural differences between country pairs. Indeed, the friendly relations between Austria and Hungary in their common history (until 1918) might influence trade patterns -a factor that certainly has no effect in Ireland-Hungary relations. Therefore, we complete pooled regressions by the application of panel techniques with fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) specification. Finally, with OLS we assume a constant variance in the error term. In samples with very large differences in country pairs, such as Germany-Slovenia compared to Austria-Slovenia, we might meet with heteroscedasticity. Indeed, specifications with cross-section weights produce higher t-values, and we cannot assume constant variances to be appropriate.
Predictions on signs:
In first generation models of (horizontal) intra-industry trade, the RELGDPC variable explains (with a negative sign) the inter-industry trade component of total trade. In a (second generation) model of vertically dominated trade, this variable should appear with a positive sign, when it explains differences in capital/labour ratios, and the RELTECH variable should obtain a negative sign. If VIIT were driven by technology differences (the neoRicardian model), we should obtain the opposite signs in both variables. The coefficient to RELINDIS should be positive in both cases, supposed we applied a meaningful method of disentangling vertical and horizontal trade.
The first-generation theory of intra-industry trade predicts a positive (negative) sign for MINSIZE (MAXSIZE), since size stands for similarity and common consumer tastes. 7 Vertical intra-industry trade theory does not clearly predict the signs for size variables. Durkin and Krygier (2000) found the opposite behaviour of the variables in total IIT, VIIT and HIIT estimations. The expected sign for DISTANCE is negative for all IIT specifications, for the relevance of transaction costs in trade with differentiated goods is higher compared to interindustry trade with homogeneous goods. The predicted sign of the customs union dummy (CUDUM) is negative for all specifications, for lifting trade barriers diminishes trade costs.
Finally, we run the same models for HIIT specifications in order to check VIIT results for robustness. If the VIIT variables do not explain HIIT, all the REL-variables should obtain negative signs.
Calculation of variables. Methodological issues:
Since data on income distribution is the limiting factor in comparative research, and allows for only three years' observations in this study, we calculated the trade variable for the years 1993, Often, vertical intra-industry indices are split into high-quality and low-quality components.
From the theoretical perspective such a de-composition is not necessary, for vertical and high- 10 quality vertical intra-industry trade models include the same set of (factor endowment) variables.
From the empirical point of view, there is no need for running regressions for each component.
The rationale of presenting this split here is to show that there might be a product-quality cycle in trade relations. As Figure 3 depicts, most country-pairs include a quality advantage of the EU country, although somewhat eroding.
Factor endowment and technology differences: The widespread used indicator for factor endowment differences is the relative GDP per capita, here calculated as (GDPCC j,t minus GDPC k,t ) 10 at current exchange rates. The data is in Euro and is taken from Eurostat Online Database (2005b) . With respect to the relative position in technology, the study uses data on the number of firms applying leading technology and of firms with low technology for each country (Eurostat Online Database 2006). We decided to choose this indicator in order to obtain a picture, which is independent of value calculations such as cost variables. 11 We calculated the ratios of the numbers of leading to low technology firms for each country and took the absolute difference between two countries. The indicator can take values between 0 and 1. The higher the value is the larger is the technology difference.
Income distribution: The country-pair observations of (changes of) differences in income inequality are calculated according to the overlap concept, which Flam and Helpman (1987) directly derived from theory. The overlap income distribution argument is 
Households with an income less than h d consume the low-quality variety of differentiated products, and households with a higher income consume the high-quality variety.
Any change in the cumulative distribution functions is positively correlated with vertical intraindustry trade. There are some significant differences to the empirical overlap concept, Durkin and Krygier (2000) used. Firstly, this study is based on deciles and not quintiles. Secondly, the larger income differences between EU and CEE countries compared to the US-OECD framework in Durkin and Krygier, requires a more sophisticated method of calculation of the dividing income class. 12 We assume the dividing income class in the framework j-k to be around the 
This study uses personal income distribution, for it captures not only changes in the relation of market wages and market profits, but also redistribution from tax policy and changes in the social system. The concept assumes a dividing income class in each national economy. in technology differences, and the standard deviation shows some convergence among countrypairs. In income distribution, the first impression is a declining difference in country-pair income distribution between EU and CEECs. This general decline seems to reflect the reaction of policy to the increasing poverty ratios among the populations of transition countries. The largest bilateral difference was between Germany and Romania, and the lowest difference was between Denmark and Poland in the third year of observation.
Income distribution data is taken from World Income Inequality Database (UNU/WIDER 2005).
Other variables: (MINSIZE j (MAXSIZE) selects the lower (larger) GDP in Euro in current exchange rates from a pair of countries. In most, but not all, cases MINSIZE stands for the CEE country and MAXSIZE for the EU country.
13 DISTANCE is measured in kilometres between the capitals of both countries. Table 1 12
ESTIMATIO RESULTS
Columns (1) throughout (6) of Table 2 show the results according to the three model specifications (pooled, fixed and random effects) for vertical intra-industry trade. The explanatory power (R 2 ) in pooled and fixed effects models is high enough to assume that intraindustry trade is not a pure statistical phenomenon due to inappropriate calculations. The FE model in (3) and (4) is superior to the pooled specification in (1) and (2) since sum squared residuals are lower. Nevertheless, the regressions with pooled data present the important information that distance and being a member of customs union obtain the expected negative signs both regressions (but, DISTANCE is insignificant in the second model). We find FE to be highly significant. 14 The explanatory power improves significantly compared to pooled regressions, which means that country-pair effects have a relevant impact on vertical trade
patterns. The Hausman test shows that the RE model in (6) is not appropriate. In (5) the Chisquared statistics is close to the 10% level of significance, but the sum squared residuals are still above those of the respective FE specification in (3). Hence, we do not take the Hausman test too literally and assume the FE specification as appropriate.
For FE specifications the income distribution variable obtains the predicted positive sign: with higher bilateral difference in income distribution, the share of VIIT in total trade increases.
Comparing (3) and (4), we are also able to conclude that differences in technology (RELTECH) are the driving force in EU-CEEC trade structures, while differences in factor endowment (RELGDPC) are not. RELGDPC appears with a negative sign, and we may reject the neo-HO hypothesis of VIIT. 15 This negative sign contradicts to most other literature on vertical intraindustry trade (see section 1). An exception are Caetano and Galego (2007) , who found also a negative sign for the relative GDP per capita variable, and positive signs for Foreign Direct Investment and human capital investment (which could be seen as other versions of our technology variable). Both authors calculated the IIT shares according to Fontagnè -Freudenberg (1997) , who identified trade as intra-industry, if the minority trade flow is at least 10% of the majority trade flow. With respect to the size variables, we cannot confirm the findings of Durkin -Krygier (2000) . In (3), we find a negative impact on VIIT if an EU country was significantly Table 2 13 larger than the less advanced CEE country (MAXSIZE). On the other side, a positive impact on VIIT appeared when the less developed CEE country was significantly smaller than the EU country. In (4), the composition of signs changed. OLS estimations (Appendix Table. 
CO CLUSIO S
Our objective was to explain vertical intra-industry trade between old and new EU countries either by differences in factor endowment or in technology, and to specify the role of changing income distribution of former socialist countries during their transition toward a market economy.
With respect to our starting position, we believe that the results contribute some progressive insights to the literature:
The first conclusion is about the driving force of production localisation in the regional framework considered: costs or technology? We made it possible to disentangle both determinants, backed by different theories. Estimations tend to produce a significant positive correlation between technology differences and vertical trade. A negative correlation was found between GDP per capita differences, which are usually seen as proxy for factor endowment differences, and vertical trade. Therefore, there is some indication of a product-quality cycle in EU-CEEC relations; upgrading in terms of technology seems very realistic, but catching-up scenarios should be viewed with caution. Obviously, such a statement would include the contribution of foreign direct investment in structural change and growth in former transition
countries. An issue for further research might be to test the cycle view by an analysis of crossborder production sharing, where R&D activities and the high-quality production remain in the headquarter of the developed country, and assembly plants are located in the poorer countries. Ando -Kimura (2005) found evidence for such a cross-border fragmentation in trade data of Japan with the CEECs. Another issue for further research might be to check whether our results are due to some noise in the vertical intra-industry determinant. It cannot be ignored that at the 4-digit level of trade, the variables might be still contaminated with a good portion of inter-industry elements, although R 2 s in regressions were high enough to exclude results being purely accidental. Our decomposition of vertical trade disregards extreme price differences in exports and imports due to, for example, transfer pricing and related behaviour of firms (see GabrischSzalai 2002 , for an approach to use unit values in estimating the size of such behaviour). Also, a
Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin or Neo-Ricardian approach can hardly capture such phenomena in trade like international production sharing; back-and-forth transactions are hardly to reconcile with a quality ladder. There is some recent research on that issue (Ando 2006) .
Changes in personal income distribution seem to play a role for changing trade patterns.
This brings us to the second conclusion that the distributional effects of policies matter. When we assume that horizontal trade patterns are based on similar income distribution, a government might influence the shift to a more horizontal pattern by considering the distributional effects of its policies. In CEECs, income distribution shifted towards more inequality in their early transition period, and might have contributed to the high vertical shares in trade. But later we observe a correction towards more equality, which seems to have been a reason for the falling vertical and increasing horizontal shares in trade. Further research should compare both regions of the enlarged Union individually in order to find out whether income distribution schemes tend to converge or diverge, and whether this has an impact on trade patterns.
APPE DIX

Grubel-Lloyd index
In equation (2), T jk is the intra-industry share in total trade between a pair of countries j (home) and k (foreign), and for a set of n industries with X being the exports of the home country and M being its imports from the foreign country in the individual industry i: The share of inter-industry trade in total trade is (1-T jk ). Although the prescription for calculation makes a sharp cut between inter-and intra-industry trade, T jk is necessarily contaminated with some noise, for the data are for industries and not for individual goods. And here, disaggregating is relevant. With low-digit disaggregation (2-digit, for example), the index includes some inter-industry trade (Celi -Smith 1999) . Therefore, a high-digit level is preferable for calculating the index. But with more disaggregated data, the number of empty entries in statistical reporting increases, and specific methods like the Heckman technique (see MilgramBaleix and Moro-Egido 2006) are needed to avoid biased estimation results. In order to mitigate the trade-off problem and keep the tools simple we decided to choose the 4-digit level. 16 We pay particular attention to R 2 of regressions in order to become certain that the chosen level is not too much distorted by inappropriate calculation. Furthermore, intra-industry trade models assume balanced total trade, and imbalances might distort the correct measurement of shares. However, the empirical literature has not confirmed the superiority of the trade-balance adjusted GL index, and we use the unadjusted index in regressions. 17 Fontagné -Freudenberg (1997) suggested an approach as alternative to the overlap concept of Grubel -Lloyd, defining all products as of the intra-industry part where imports account for at least 10% of exports. Also, they found in their 2005 study (2005, p. 17) the results of both methods to be highly correlated. This conclusion seems to be confirmed by the comparison of our regression results with the results of CaetanoGalego (2007) , who used the method of Fontagné -Freudenberg.
Disentangling horizontal and vertical trade
Intra-industry trade concerning a specific kind of goods is horizontal when the prices of the for all items p = 1....m, which fulfil the condition:
Within this range, trade is assumed to be horizontally differentiated, and outside of the range, equation 3 produces the share of vertical intra-industry trade. Those items with an RUV > (1+a) yield a high-quality position in the EU's trade, and those with an RUV < (1-a) yield a low-quality position. However, with respect to possibly large differences of RUV in trade of economically advanced countries with developing countries, Fontagné -Freudenberg (1997 , 2005 argue to choose a higher threshold (a = 0.25). The consequence would be to move a part of formerly identified vertical trade relations to the horizontal component. The relative weight of extreme RUVs in VIIT would increase. Although the algorithm ensures that all items beyond the threshold belong to vertical intra-industry trade, the results of such a statistical exercise should not be taken too literally. It is not very plausible to assume that two items with a price difference of more than 1,000% really stand for two varieties of the same goods and prices stand for quality differences.
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